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VOLUME 47 WINTER 1997 NUMBER 2
COLLOQUIUM
BRIDGING SOCIETY, CULTURE,
AND LAW: THE ISSUE OF
FEMALE CIRCUMCISION
INTRODUCTION
James T. Dixon'
In the early summer of 1996, this law review was presented
with the opportunity to contribute to the debate over the issue of
female circumcision. Popular opinion of the issue has been influ-
enced in part by a series of op-ed pieces and articles in the New
York Times by A.M. Rosenthal and Celia W. Dugger.' Academic
debate has taken place in a range of contexts, from articles and
t Editor in Chief, Case Western Reserve Law Review. B.A. Denison University. J.D.
Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. On behalf of the entire staff,
I would like to thank all of the participants in this forum, particularly Professor Obiora
for her initiative and cooperation. I would personally like to thank the associates who
worked on each of these pieces, and Jon Hyman, Ann Skerry, and Sheila Saegh for their
countless hours of editorial oversight. Carolyn Speaker and Rob Chaloupka also provided
needed support in the Publications Office. I should also thank each member of the Execu-
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1. See, e.g., A.M. Rosenthal, On My Mind: The Torture Continues, N.Y. TIMEs, July
27, 1993, at A13; Celia W. Dugger, African Ritual Pain: Genital Cutting, N.Y. TIMES,
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notes in law reviews to feature pieces in ethics-oriented periodi-
cals.2 The issue was also becoming a key policy concern with the
emergence of gender issues on the global stage. From the continent
of Africa to Beijing to the territories of Western nations, view-
points on the matter were rapidly, and in some cases fiercely,
emerging. The timeliness of the issue, then, was a key consider-
ation in determining to sponsor this forum.
Our opportunity for involvement came in the form Professor
Leslye Obiora's article Bridges and Barricades: Rethinking Polem-
ics and Intransigence in the Campaign Against Female Circumci-
sion.3 Professor Obiora, an Igbo woman conducting research and
teaching in the United States, presented to us a theoretical and
practical perspective that ran counter to much that we had read on
this issue. Impressed by the depth and breadth of analysis and
research marshalled in support of this perspective, we resolved to
work toward the inclusion in this debate of contributors from vari-
ous disciplines who could add enriching perspective to Obiora's
provocative arguments. It has been both a privilege and a great
learning experience working with these scholars, and we trust that
you will appreciate their contributions.
Before introducing these commentaries and Professor Obiora's
article, it may be best to begin with a brief description of some of
the forms of the practice, the terminology used to describe the
practice, and the thematic focus of this colloquium. A description
of the forms and nomenclature is important because of their critical
role in framing the debate in general, and Professor Obiora's argu-
ments in particular. As noted by Obiora, there are many variations
of the practice that is generically referred to here as "female cir-
cumcision."4 Those practices with the most minor physical con-
sequences are highly symbolic acts that merely involve the pricking
of the clitoris.5 The next variant is referred to by Muslims as
2. See, e.g., Hope Lewis, Between Irua and "Female Genital Mutilation": Feminist
Human Rights Discourse and the Cultural Divide, 8 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (1995); San-
dra D. Lane & Robert A. Rubinstein, Judging the Other: Responding to Traditional Fe-
male Genital Surgeries, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, May-June 1996, at 31.
3. See L. Amede Obiora, Bridges and Barricades: Rethinking Polemics and Intransi-
gence in the Campaign Against Female Circumcision, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 275
(1997).
4. See id at 287-89.
5. See id. at 288.
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sunna and involves the removal of the clitoral hood.6 More in-
volved forms of the practice are referred to as excision or eitori-
dectomy and involve the severing of the clitoris and some of the
labia majora and minora. The form with the most severe physical
consequences is referred to as infibulation and involves the scrap-
ing and sewing together of the labia majora'
Some of the controversy over female circumcision is centered
on the terminology used to label these practices. The phrase "fe-
male genital mutilation" is perhaps the most widely used common
reference.9 Other participants in the debate have chosen to use the
terms "female genital surgeries,"'' "genital alteration,"" or "geni-
tal cutting."' 2 Obiora refers to the practice generally as "female
circumcision," but distinguishes among the variations as neces-
sary. 3 Thus, in the interest of uniformity and coherence, the term
"female circumcision" is used in this introduction and the title of
this colloquium. This is not, of course, intended to preempt or
conclude the debate over terminology. "
The question of terminology is but one of many themes that
run throughout this colloquium. The broadest theme, as suggested
by the title of this colloquium, is how the issue of female circum-
cision highlights the relationship between society, culture, and law.
Within a particular conception of a just society, how is a specific
cultural practice that may not comport with the tenets of that soci-
ety to be addressed? Does the institution of the law provide the
appropriate framework for understanding and attending to the com-
plexities of this tension? Should the initial inquiry, then, concern
6. See id.
7. See id. at 288-89.
8. See Obiora, supra note 3, at 289.
9. See, e.g., Layli Miller Bashir, Female Genital Mutilation in the United States: An
Examination of Criminal and Asylum Law, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 415, 416 (1996).
The Inter-African Committee on Traditional Practices officially adopted the terms "female
genital mutilation" in 1991. The Committee did so while acknowledging that "terminology
is a tool that may be used as appropriate to a given context and where genital mutilation
does not make sense community workers would naturally use the appropriate colloquial
terms." Letter from Seble Dawit, Director, Alliances: An African Women's Network, to
Professor Leslye Amede Obiora 1 (Nov. 4, 1996) (on file with the Case Western Reserve
Law Review) [hereinafter Dawit Letter].
10. See, e.g., Lane & Rubinstein, supra note 2, at 31.
11. See, e.g., Pauline E. Peters, Another Bridge to Cross: Between "Outsider" and
"Insider," 47 CAsE W. REs. L. REV. 479, 480 (1997).
12. See, e.g., Dugger, supra note 1, at 1.
13. See Obiora, supra note 3, at 290.
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how a particular society defines itself and its ideals? In relation to
the debate over female circumcision, this question gives rise to the
issue of "universal" or "fundamental" human rights.
These "universals" lead to a calling into question of the spe-
cific cultural practice. Should a concrete assessment of the practice
be a precondition for the initiation of legal reform? Does this as-
sessment then lead to the preference of other solutions? Such an
assessment necessarily involves the placement of the practice in
context-assessing its origins and the reasons for its persistence, as
well as defining its various forms. A key strength of the pieces
that compose this colloquium is that they endeavor to avoid ques-
tionable assumptions-assumptions regarding the conception of a
society, the context of the cultural practice that may conflict with
this conception, and the role of law in resolving the tension.
One appeal of Professor Obiora's article lies in its sustained
discussion of the complex issues that surround the practice of
female circumcision-including issues raised by recently enacted
legislation in the United States banning the practice. 4 As it is im-
possible to do justice to the sophistication of Obiora's arguments
within the constraints of this introduction, a close reading of the
article in its entirety is encouraged. The broad theme of this collo-
quium mirrors the structure of her article. The various sections of
the article highlight differing conceptions of society, illustrate the
context that gives meaning to the practice of female circumcision,
and provide textured analysis of several approaches to the problems
14. See Celia W. Dugger, New Law Bans Genital Cutting in United States, N.Y.
Timm, Oct. 12, 1996, at Al (noting that the Centers for Disease Control has determined
that female circumcision may affect up to 150,000 women in the United States).
In enacting the legislation, Congress listed six findings concerning female circumci-
sion: (1) it is carried on by certain cultural and religious groups in the United States; (2)
it results in physical and psychological harm to women; (3) it infringes on statutory and
constitutional rights; (4) it is beyond the control of state or local governments; (5) it can
be prohibited without infringing first amendment rights; and (6) Congress has the authority
to enact the prohibition via the necessary and proper clause. See 142 CONG. REC.
Hl1,644-01, Hll,829 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996). The law is aimed at anyone who "know-
ingly circumcises, excises, or infibulates the whole or any part of the labia majora, labia
minora or clitoris of another person who has not attained the age of 18 years." Id.
The legislation also requires that the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS")
provide information about the legal consequences of performing female genital mutilation,
or allowing it to be performed on a minor, to aliens who receive visas. The INS is also
directed to provide information regarding "the severe harm to physical and psychological
health caused by female gential mutilation which is compiled and presented in a manner
limited to the practice itself and respectful to the cultural values in which such practice
takes place." Id.
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posed by the practice. The article commences with a description of
the priority given to violence against women at the 1995 United
Nations World Conference on Women. Here, Obiora illuminates,
inter alia, the tension between the universalization of individual
human rights and cultural autonomy or self-determination."5
Obiora delineates a wealth of cultural contexts for the various
forms of female circumcision. In the section entitled Quest for Lost
Origins,6 she searches for the reasons underlying the origin of the
practices. Beginning with anthropological constructs of the origin
and perpetuation of the practice, she underscores regional and
national variations. Among the explanations offered for the prac-
tice, Obiora emphasizes those based on patriarchy. She then draws
parallels between female circumcision and elective surgery in the
West, and takes issue with the exclusionary terms of some Western
anti-circumcision discourses.
In the sections of the article entitled Quest for Change7 and
Orchestrating Change" Obiora analyses strategies and proposes
alternative modes of approaching the issue. Existing strategies
range from the evolving recognition of female circumcision as
grounds for granting refugee status to women who are at risk of
circumcision in their homeland, to more traditional legal
mechanisms aimed at penalizing the practitioners of female circum-
cision. Obiora discusses some of the limitations of these strate-
gies, drawing upon Anglo-American traditions; such as the right to
bodily integrity, the sanctity of the family, the right to privacy, and
the right of religious freedom. She then proceeds to assess the
merit of certain extra-legal alternatives, including education, eco-
nomic empowerment, and dlinicalization. As she puts it, this is
with a view to explore "the possibility of a bottom-up transitional
transformation ...and its potential for bridging the rift between
polarized views."
Reactions to Professor Obiora's article are provided by emi-
nent scholars who pursue respective themes discussed in her article.
These reactions are arranged according to how they relate to the
three component parts of the broad theme of this colloquium: (1)
15. See Obiora, supra note 3, at 275-87.
16. See id. at 292.
17. See id. at 332.
18. See id. at 361.
19. See id. at 333-34, 336-43.
20. See, Obiora, supra note 3, at 377.
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the "universal" or "fundamental" human fights analysis; (2) the
question of culture and cultural context; and, (3) the search for le-
gal/alternative solutions. Several contributors address all three
themes or provide overarching criticism of the female circumcision
debate. These comments are grouped together and appear after
those that relate to the individual components of the broad theme.
Again, this introduction can provide only a brief summary of the
position of each author, and a close reading of each is encouraged.
Several individuals we invited to participate were unable to do
so because of time constraints or conflicting commitments, and we
regret not being able to feature their contributions.2 We had invit-
ed Seble Dawit, an African human rights activist who has earned
the respect of many for her sincere commitment to the anti-circum-
cision campaign, to write a prologue and an epilogue for this col-
loquium. At the last minute, we received a letter sent by Dawit
from Africa explaining that it was not possible for her to partici-
pate. This letter raised several important issues that are worth men-
tioning here. Dawit "disagree[s] wholeheartedly with [Obiora's]
conclusions regarding medicalization," viewing it as "a serious
setback to the efforts of African women to eradicate this prac-
tice." Dawit also questioned why Obiora's failure to state her
own position on the eradication of genital mutilation, and her
silencing of the voices of African women involved in the anti-cir-
cumcision campaign.'
With reference to this silencing, Dawit argues that Obiora
"ignore[s] the logical location and primary actors of the movement
to eliminate genital mutilation."24 Although the command of rele-
vant literature exhibited in Obiora's article is impressive, her sourc-
es, of course, are not exhaustive. Though Obiora's sources do pres-
ent salient works by many Africans, this colloquium certainly could
have benefited if Dawit had discussed other African activists. Con-
21. These include Jane Larson, V.Y. Mudimbe, Margaret Jane Radin, Lawrence Rosen,
Chris Miller, Francois Lionnet, Martha Minow, Nahid Toubia, Elizabeth Mertz, Kimberle
Williams Crenshaw, and Martha Nusbaum.
22. See Dawit Letter, supra note 9, at 1.
23. See id. at 2. One individual who was able to participate in this colloquium similar-
ly takes issue with Obiora's medicalization proposal, her perceived silencing of African
women, and her personal position on the issue. See Isabelle R. Gunning, Uneasy Alliances
and Solid Sisterhood: A Response to Professor Obiora's Bridges and Barricades, 47 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 443 (1997); see also infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
24. See Dawit Letter, supra note 9, at 1.
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ceming Obiora's failure to choose a side in the debate, it is clear
at the outset, indeed, in the title of her article, that she chose to
avoid the for/against nature of the debate. In this way, Dawit's
participation may have served to illustrate the polarization of posi-
tions in the debate. We were eager to include Dawit's reasoned
criticism of Obiora's arguments, and regret that her withdrawal has
deprived our audience of an cpportunity to savor another perspec-
tive.'
Professor Lawrence Friedman of Stanford Law School, who
supervised Professor Obiora's doctoral dissertation and fostered her
commitment to legal scholarship, directly addresses the question of
defining "universal" or "fundamental" human rights. His comment,
short-titled The War of the Worlds,' recognizes that the construc-
tion of this definition is not a theoretical dispute over the conflict
between fundamental rights and cultural practices. Rather, the enter-
prise implicates a more practical consideration of where to draw
the line between the two.27 Friedman points out that culture can
mean something as simple as a choice of clothing to a complex
"marrow-deep belieff" whose alteration may injure the group that
adheres to it.' After an historical analysis of the derivation of and
clash between cultural claims and fundamental rights, Friedman
concludes by placing Obiora's article in the "zone of free fire"
between the two.29
Professor Emeritus Edmund Gordon of Yale University works
to support Obiora's position of respect for cultural context by
bringing to bear insights from the "intersection between our grow-
ing knowledge of culture, pedagogy, and psychology."'  He pro-
ceeds from the premise that there are "no ... differences in cogni-
tive and affective processes" among human groups, and notes that
"[w]hen we speak of culture, we are speaking of both the cause
and product of human affect and cognition."' Gordon establishes
25. I also regret that the constraints of this forum prevent us from further engaging in
the compelling debate that these arguments foreshadow. We hope to provide a forum for
that debate, and others, in a site we are developing on the World Wide Web.
26. See Lawrence M. Friedman, The War of the Worlds: A Few Comments on Law,
Culture, and Rights, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 379 (1997).
27. See id. at 380.
28. Id. at 381.
29. Id. at 387.
30. Edmund W. Gordon, Cultural Identity and Behavioral Change, 47 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 389, 398 (1997).
31. Id. at 391 (citation omitted).
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five fundamental dimensions of the cultural construct and defines
how culture provides referents, stimuli, and consequences for be-
havior.32 He concludes that behavioral change that occurs outside
of an accommodation of and adaptation to cultural context "tends
not to become a stable and internalized part of the learner's reper-
toire.
33
Professor Kathryn Abrams, a prolific feminist critic currently
teaching at Northwestern University School of Law, reveals that
Obiora's analysis has related domestic application to "feminist
debates of an intra-cultural nature."'34 Abrams applies elements of
Obiora's method to an analysis of women whose lives are more
culturally proximate in a discussion of Joan Nestle's essay The
Fem Question.3 5 Her approach is intended to provide assistance
for feminists in confronting practices deemed self-subordinating, or
rife with compromised agency or false consciousness. 6
Dr. M.A. Ogbu, a noted public health expert, analyzes both
cultural context and alternative solutions. Ogbu begins by noting
that the issue of female circumcision "is a complex and sensitive
issue with many personal and social ramifications in cultural con-
texts."'38 She enriches the debate by adding comments that focus
on Africa, urging participants to base their discourse on empirical
evidence and a systematic analysis of cultural practices.39 With
reference to solutions, Ogbu shows that legislative reforms in Afri-
can nations have been ineffective.' She also takes issue with
Obiora's proposals for education and clinicalization, and observes
that female circumcision may already be fading in frequency.41
Professor Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., whose legal scholarship
reveals a refreshing perspective on questions of constitutional law,
notes that Obiora squarely "questions the ability of law, standing
alone, to unseat long and deeply held cultural values."'42
32. See id. at 392-93.
33. Id. at 397.
34. Kathryn Abrams, Respecting Women's Lives and Investigating Women's Conscious-
ness: A Comment on Obiora, 47 CASE W. RES. L. RE. 399, 400 (1997).
35. Id. at 400.
36. See id.
37. See M.A. Ogbu, Comment on Obiora's Bridges and Barricades, 47 CAsE W. REs.
L. REV. 411 (1997).
38. Id.
39. See id. at 412-13.
40. See id. at 416-17.
41. See id. at 418, 419-21.
42. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Building Bridges and Overcoming Barricades: Explor-
[Vol. 47:263
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Krotoszynski's own questioning occurs in the context of an analy-
sis of law's ability to lead fundamental, transformational social
change. Krotoszynski's initial point of comparison is to the Ameri-
can civil rights movement, where he asserts that it was individual
and group demands for change that led the law. The lesson, he
concludes, is that greater cultural sensitivity "is an absolute pre-
requisite to effective legislative reforms."'43
Professor Isabelle R. Gunning, a legal scholar who has written
extensively on the subject of female circumcision, highlights points
on which she agrees with Professor Obiora, and others on which
they disagree.' In particular, Gunning finds that Obiora
monolithically defines the lives of Western women, while opposing
such narrowness in relation to African women. Gunning prefers to
view most women as involved in an "'entangled reality ... recon-
stituted by a multitude of contradictory structures 'and process-
es.' '' 45 Gunning also argues that Obiora oversimplifies the lives of
African women while muting the African voices of opposition to
female circumcision.' Gunning takes particular notice of Obiora's
proposal to clinicalize the practice of female circumcision. She
notes that proposal's practical benefits while raising questions about
some of its potential adverse affects: the possibility that modem
Western-trained health care professionals may attain a stake in the
perpetuation of the practices, the potential for male-centered control
within these clinics, and the chance that this would lead to "regula-
tion" and nothing more.'
Professor Micere Githae Mugo of Syracuse University, a re-
nowned African literary and cultural critic, focuses on the negative
role played by popular literature, in particular Alice Walker's Pos-
sessing the Secret of Joy and Alice Walker and Pratibha Parmar's
Warrior Marks, while exploring the cultural imperialism inherent in
the themes of these works.' Coining the phrase "external messiah
syndrome," Mugo highlights the danger of silencing and stigmatiza-
ing the Limits of Law as an Agent of Transformational Change, 47 CAsE W. RES. L.
REv. 421, 434 (1997).
43. Id. at 425.
44. See Gunning, supra note 23, at 443.
45. Id. at 447 (quoting Obiora, supra note 3, at 304).
46. See id. at 448-49.
47. See id. at 455-57.
48. See Micere Githae Mugo, Elitist Anti-Circumcision Discourse as Mutilating and
Anti-Feminist, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 459, 460-61 (1997).
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tion created by even the best-intentioned of anti-circumcision cam-
paigners.' 9 After making clear her position on the practice of fe-
male circumcision, Mugo argues that the focus works are rife with
problems: they are decontextualizing, typifying, objectifying,
disempowering, and dominating." A true and lasting solution,
Mugo concludes, must endow women with power and agency "so
that they can do away with oppressive traditions, conditions, and
relationships."'
Dr. Pauline Peters of the Harvard Institute of International
Development, whose study on African women and development
supports a portion of Obiora's argument, contributes an analysis
that is positioned both inside and outside of the existing debate. 2
She argues for a more complete consideration of "insider" perspec-
tives on the practice; perspectives that may themselves vary within
a particular culture 3 For the "outsiders" she urges the avoidance
of essentialism and a more close-fitting relationship between de-
scription and reality in the naming of particular forms of female
circumcision. 4 She then wonders why this topic has attracted such
attention, and what effects this attention may have on the debate.55
Highlighting several effects and the added distortions of
polemicism, Peters concludes that an "insider" focus is necessary to
inform the debate 6
Professor Preston Williams of the Harvard Divinity School, in
addressing each component of this colloquium's broad theme, first
speaks of "orient[ing] us to a standard that will be most supportive
of the dignity and worth of individuals."" Examining the cultural
context in which female circumcision occurs, Williams states that
"[w]hat we should investigate is whether or not the ritual ... is
free from coercion, is not physically harmful, and in fact accurately
represents what it alleges to contribute to a woman's sense of
worth and dignity."" Williams draws several conclusions about
49. Id. at 460.
50. See id. at 477-78.
51. Id. at 478.
52. See Peters, supra note 11, at 479.
53. See id. at 482-85.
54. See id. at 481.
55. See id. at 484.
56. See id. at 487.
57. Preston Williams, A Personal Perspective on the Elimination of Female Circumci-
sion, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 489, 489 (1997).
58. Id. at 492.
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the practice and alternatives that may lead to its elimination, favor-
ing the use of education and law (as both a form of education and
a restraint on behavior).5 9
Professor Emerita Sylvia Wynter of Stanford University notes
that Obiora, as a feminist and a native, is forced to defend the
practice's rationality to its practitioners against the criticism of
other feminists.' Wynter then argues that both feminist and West-
ern discourse contain a specific culturally defined episteme, and
that Obiora's criticism of the terms of this debate calls both into
question. Thus, Obiora is in a paradox, both relying on Western
and feminist principles in order to resolve the issue while "devas-
tatingly deconstrct[ing]" these principles in order to do so.6
Wynter moves beyond this positional critique to provide a vast
framework of analysis involving, in part, what it means to be a
"good" man or a "good" woman.62 This is defined by the contrast
between being and non-being-between life and death, white and
non-white, rich and poor, developed and underdeveloped, and un-
circumcised and circumcised. Wynter concludes that Obiora's anal-
ysis may be a first step toward the realization of a "Second Emer-
gence," and that this realization is appropriately based on a cultural
practice spanning millennia.6'
For legal scholars and policy makers, the importance of these
theoretical arguments is secured by the efforts of governments to
use the law to alter or eradicate the practice of female circumci-
sion. A crucial aspect of female circumcision, or any other cultural
practice, is the conditioned nature of the human behavior that leads
to its origin and perpetuation. As highlighted by Wynter in discuss-
ing these origins, "'[Man has the capacity to turn theory into ...
codings in the nervous system known as conditioning. '
Krotoszynski echoes this when he argues that "[b]efore we dismiss
the cultural importance of a practice that we find repugnant, we
should first consider the culturally conditioned nature of that re-
59. See id. at 496.
60. See Sylvia Wynter, "Genital Mutilation" or "Symbolic Birth"?: Female Circumci-
sion, Lost Origins, and the Aculturism of Feminist/Western Thought, 47 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 499, 500-501 (1997)
61. Id. at 503.
62. Id. at 510.
63. See id. at 549.
64. See id. at 510 (quoting Antonio T. de Nicolas, Notes on the Biology of Religion,
. Soc. & BIOLOGICAL STRUCTURES, Apr. 1981, at 219, 225)
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sponse."5 Thus, theory affects both the origin of cultural practice
and the response of those challenging the practice.
The contributions to the debate over female circumcision gath-
ered in this colloquium evince an effort to fully define the founda-
tion of theory that informs this debate: to ensure the finely devel-
oped conception of a just society, to ensconce the particular cul-
tural practice in the context of social conditioning in which it
exists, and to accurately and equitably choose between alternative
solutions when the cultural practice does not comport with the
conception of a just society. Thus, theory will most ably be trans-
formed into conditioning by a choice among various methods, and
that conditioning will most readily transform behavior. In this way
the issue of female circumcision may serve as an example of how
a sturdy bridge between society, law, and culture may be built.
65. Krotoszynsld, supra note 42, at 423-24.
(V/ol. 47.263
